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The Importation of Arms and the 1912
Mormon "Exodus" from Mexico
B. CARMON HARDY and MELODY SEYMOUR

In the hot, dry days of late July and early August 1912, thousands of
North Americans raced north across the border into the United States at
El Paso, Texas and Hachita, New Mexico. Due to revolutionary violence in Mexico, refugees had filtered north for months. This latest,
unexpected wave was by far the largest. It consisted mostly of polygamous families from Mormon colonies in Chihuahua and Sonora.
Crowded into makeshift facilities at the EI. Paso lumber yard and a
quickly constructed tent city at Hachita, their presence soon became
the object of curious journalists. Many outside the area became aware
for the first time that Mormons, or Latter~day Saints, lived south of the
United States-Mexican border and had resided there for a generation.'
The earliest arrivals consisted chiefly of women and children
shepherded by male guardians. Subsequent crossings into both Texas
and New Mexico involved larger numbers of men, always well armed. 2
The episode was the reverse play of the Mormons' entry into' Mexico a
quarter century earlier. In the mid-1880s, Mormon polygamists fled
from United States marshals who, enforcing statutes prohibiting bigamous marriage, jailed "cohabs" by the hundreds. 3 Church leaders erroneously believed plural marriage was legal in Mexico and recommended
that men having more than one wife go the're as a way to continue the
practice. 4 Acting on such advic'e, and driven by fear of imprisonment,
hundreds of Latter-day Saints abandoned their properties or sacrificed
them at great loss.
.
B. Carmon Hardy is professor of history at California State University, Fullerton.
He has published in the fields of Mormon history, Latin American history, and American Constitutional history. Melody Seymour received her M.A. degree at California
State University, Fullerton in 1994. Her research interests include Mormon history and
U.S. social history.
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Because of their haste and the large number of weapons they carried, the Mormons gave the appearance of hostile invaders. Mexican
officials reacted in the spring of 1885 by demanding that they withdraw to the United States. s The settlers responded by sending representatives to Mexico City where they met with government ministers, asking
that the demand for their removal be reconsidered. After a series of
conferences, President of the Republic Porfirio Diaz rescinded the expulsion order and encouraged the Mormons to remain. 6 The Mormons
eventually established nine major colonies, most within a day's journey of the border. By the time of the Mexican Revolution, those living
in these communities amounted to between four and five thousand residents. 7 Scholars have known for decades that they were the largest group
of alien farmers to settle in the Mexican republic during the porfiriato.
Mormonism's southward reach constituted what was, perhaps, the most
conspicuous North American salient in all Mexico: their well-cultivated
fields and tidy villages contrasted sharply with the surrounding communities. 8
Despite Mormon prosperity and socially exclusive behavior, revolutionary hostility toward them was never as great as might have been
expected. This is not to say that resentments arising from their wealth
and nationality went unexpressed. When contending armies were in their
areas, Mormons sometimes experienced abuse. 9 But the injuries and indignities inflicted upon them were distinctly less than those suffered
by others-such as the ChineseY The relative safety enjoyed by the
Mormons was remarkable even to themselves. Only when armaments
became an issue did abandonment of their settlements become necessary.
Evidence of the colonists' general immunity during the Madero
phase of the Revolution is found in Mormon commentary itself The
settlers interpreted this immunity as proof of the truth of their religion
and an instance of providential favor. Writing in mid-1911, one settler
confided in his diary that, while the Revolution would likely continue
for years, "we as a people will be preserved by the hand of the Lord as
we have in the past for our preservation has already been miraculous."ll
A Mormon authority speaking in Mexico City in late 1911 told how
"prospects were never brighter for the spread of the gospel in this land,
and we look forward to a bright and prosperous future for the Mexican
Mission."12
Circumstances changed, however, during the early months of 1912.
Although Diaz was driven from office, violence flared under Emiliano
Zapata in the south and Pasqual Orozco, Ir. in the north, who charged
the new government of Francisco 1. Madero with betrayal of promises
made to the people. Orozco, a celebrated guerrillero from western Chihuahua, joined dissenters calling for Madero's overthrow. 13 In the words
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of Chihuahua's Maderista governor, Abraham Gonzalez, his state became the ''foco principal" of this new rebellion. 14 The colorados, or
Red Flaggers, who followed Orozco swept into their ranks many who,
indifferent to the ideals of the Revolution, looked upon disorder as an
opportunity to enrich themselves. Banditry and easy slogans to justify
it quickly led to attacks on anyone and anything that held the possibil- .
ity of loot. As one Mormon colonist later recalled: "The Revolution
started as a great adventure for everybody. Then [with the rise of the
Orozquistas] they got nasty with each other and [started] fighting in
little groups. "15
By late February 1912, the crisis reached such proportions that Governor Gonzalez warned civilians in the countryside to arm themselves
against the "terrible cancer of anarchy" sweeping his state. 16 Gonzalez
himself was soon forced into hiding, when a rump legislature assumed
power in Chihuahua City in early March. Accusing the Madero regime
of failing to implement needed reforms, the new rebel governor Felipe
R. Gutierrez told how, reposing their trust in "30:-30s," they would take
their rightful due. 17 Matters rapidly deteriorated into what one contemporary described as "genuine anarchy."18 Responding to the upheaval,
the United States government warned its ·citizens to leave Mexico if
they were endangered. Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson, who described
growing anti-American feelings, added to the alarm. '9
With growing anti-Madero sentiment and an emboldened Mexican
population, Mormon colonists became concerned. Despite orders from
rebel leaders telling their soldiers to respect the Mormons, belligerents
sometimes took what they wanted with little regard for compensation. 20
They seized horses, stole supplies, and forcefully entered homes and
stores. 21 During the late spring and early summer of 19 I 2; at least two
Mormons, James D. Harvey and William Adams, were killed, one by a
resentful Mexican farmer, the other by a rebel soldierY After the murders, a few colonists returned to the United States. 23 Most, however,
found circumstances tolerable and, still believing their presence in
Mexico to be divinely approved, remained. The Mormons had believed
since the time of their first entry into Mexico that they were a special,
polygamous remnant and that God would be their shield. Despite increasing violence associated with the Orozquista uprising, the theme of
providential protection continued to be heard at church meetings. They
need not fear the Revolution, they were told, for they had a "mission"
to fill and the Lord would fight their battles for them. 24
Church leaders, in keeping with the recommendation of both Mexican and United States government authorities, advised Mormon settlers
to remain strictly neutral, obey whomever was in charge within their
districts, pay their taxes, and relinquish whatever material goods were
asked ofthem. 25 For the most part, the colonists did what they could to
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follow this advice. Some of the few who had become Mexican citizens, men like Anson Bowen Call and Joseph C. Bentley, who feared
that all colonists would be endangered if conscripted into the ranks of
opposing armies, spent time hiding in Arizona. 26 Children in the colonies were told not to carry mock weapons in their play for fear they
would be interpreted as favoring one faction or anotherY
Unavoidably, however, some colonists were overcome with aggravation. One wrote to his church leader that if he were asked one more
time for a gun by Mexicans, he "would give them the smokey [sic] end
of it."28 Some warned Mexican soldiers that if they did not leave them
alone, the United States government would avenge them. Yet others,
confused by the situation, said they favored everybody: "vive Madero y
Orozco tambien."29 As a result, rebels grew cynical, doubting that Mormons could be trusted. As often happens in such circumstances, by taking the part of no one, the colonists alienated all sides. As the
revolutionary Jose Ines Salazar later put it: "The Mormon colonists are
not wanted in Mexico. They have not been neutral, but two-faced."30
It was the matter of guns, however, that led to the most trouble. The
colonists had always been well-armed. As already mentioned, their conspicuous possession of firearms alarmed local officials when they first
entered Mexico in 1885. Due to self-reliance and the extensive practice
of hunting wild game, the quantity of weaponry acquired by the colonists over the years was surprisingly large. Amy Pratt Romney remembered that, by the time of the Revolution, her father owned so many
guns that their home resembled an arsenal. 3l Returning to his house one
evening in the summer of 1912, Alexander Jameson, Jr., found his home
surrounded by Mexicans who, dressed in his own shirts and trousers,
confronted him with two of his own guns. Knowing one rifle to be in
disrepair and the other unloaded, but that a pistol was hidden and ready
for use in the living room, he simply elbowed the thieves aside and
waited for them to leave. 32 Had Jameson wanted to replace the guns
that were stolen, he could have purchased them from the Mormon-owned
Union Mercantile in Colonia Dubl{m where firearms were sold. The store
manager, Henry Bowman, assured colonists that whenever such items
were taken by revolutionaries they could easily be replaced by others
from his store. 33 Colonists owned many weapons, and their Mexican
neighbors knew it.
The impoverished condition of rebel armies and their frequent presence near Mormon towns and farms made confiscation inevitable. Soldiers always demanded food, but they needed horses and weaponry
more than anything else. Mormon colonists long remembered the extraordinary indigence of soldiers marching through their properties looking for horses and guns. 34 The special dangers associated with firearms
arose from the potential for injury in the event of a scuffle but, once
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taken, they could be turned on the colonists themselves. Beyond this,
word of Mormon arms in the hands of any belligerent would erode their
image as neutrals. This is undoubtedly why Madero, when visiting the
colonists in 1911, urged them to remain neutral and whenever possible
to avoid the use of guns. Mormon leaders sometimes told settlers the
same thing, adding that they should represent themselves as poorly
armed. 35 The ample store of Mormon weaponry, however, was public
knowledge. And Red Flaggers were desperate.
The situation was further complicated by differences between
Mexico and the United States over the sale and passage of guns across
the border. While munitions passed over the international line into
Mexico throughout the Revolution, the legality of such activities was
obscure. When the uprising against Diaz commenced, United States
neutrality laws were interpreted to prohibit only the outfitting on North
American soil of organizations hostile to foreign powers. Individual
purchases taken into Mexico were considered entirely lawful. 36 There
were also differences between officials along the border over jurisdic-.
tion and interpretation that led to inconsistencies of enforcement. 37
Finally, the United States was caught between the tottering Diaz regime and growing support in the border region among both Mexicans
and North Americans for the Maderistas. 38 As a consequence, the border became little more than a sieve, allowing a steady flow of armaments into Mexico, directly aiding those partisan to Madero. 39
Responding to the situation in March 1911, United States President William Howard Taft mobilized more than 20,000 soldiers along the boundary. The new policy was intended to intimidate rebels against destruction
of American properties in Mexico while providing symbolic support
for the failing dictatorship of Diaz. 40
After Diaz' s overthrow by Madero, arms continued to move across
the border, but instead into the hands of anti~Madero Orozquistas, alarming Mexico's new leaders. Pointing to. the freedom with which armaments arrived from the north, Mexican officials took up the cry of the
Diaz regime, blaming non-enforcement by the United States of its neutrality laws for growing violence in Mexico's northern provinces. 41 Mexican consternation was increased by alarmist comments from Ambassador
Wilson who exaggerated threats to North Americans living in Mexico. 42
Once again, President Taft acted to assuage Mexico's leaders by
obtaining a joint resolution of Congress imposing an embargo <}fi all
firearms destined for Mexico. The proclamation, dated 14 March 1912,
preempted relevant provisions of the neutrality laws by banning all arms
from export to any destination in the hemisphere where violence, pro~
moted by such arms, existed. Only the president was authorized to make
exceptions to the ban. 43 United States border officials, especially Colo-

302

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

OCTOBER 1997

ne1 Edgar Z. Steever, commander of the Fourth Cavalry at Fort Bliss
near El Paso, interpreted their responsibilities so strictly that they refused passage into Mexico of anything useful to soldiers, including food,
clothing, and blankets. 44
Rather than diminishing the violence, the embargo augmented it.
Not only did the embargo stimulate greater efforts at smuggling, but
rebel demands made on foreigners living in Mexico increased. 45 As requisitions and violence grew, the "exception" clause in Taft's proclamation came under strain. The numbers of requests grew asking for
permission to import guns and ammunition into Mexico. 46 Ambassador
Wilson, who before had requested arms for United States citizens in
the Mexican capital, now renewed the petition. He asked that firearms
be given him for Americans and foreigners alike in Mexico City. The
request was approved and guns were sent. 47 Soon United States consular officers in other parts of Mexico asked that weaponry be sent to
protect North American citizens in their districts as well, including some
on the Pacific coast. 48 Unaccountably, however, no consular requests
were made on behalf of the Mormons.
In this circumstance, the colonists' leaders began thinking in more
practical terms. They did not abandon their hope for providential protection. But sensing, perhaps, that they should be as defensively prepared as others, they undertook steps to provision themselves for violent
encounter. This was a departure from decisions made in 1910. At that
time, an inventory was conducted to determine the extent and quality
of guns owned by church members in Mexico. Although the arms POS"
sessed by colonists were found to be of insufficient calibre for effective defense, it was concluded that no alteration in preparedness should
occur. 49 In the spring of 1912, when anti-Madero activity emerged,
Mormon leaders reversed themselves and decided that a lethal response
to Orozqista attackers was appropriate. Church authorities in Salt Lake
City agreed and offered to assist with the purchase of whatever weapons the colonists wanted. 50 This decision, to provision and posture themselves more defiantly than before, constituted an important and
dangerous shift in Mormon defensive strategy.
At least some of the Mormons' difficulty arose from the lack of
consistent advice by their religious leaders. Sometimes superiors told
colonists "not to furnish [the revolutionaries with] guns or ammunition
under any circumstances."51 On other occasions, however, they told colonists to comply with rebel demands for what was asked, including guns.
But the leaders said they should surrender only poorer weapons, keeping those that were best for themselves. 52 The confusing implications
of such comments were heightened by admonitions that while they
should defend their homes they were not to shed bloodY One female
colonist remembered that Anthony W. Ivins, the apostle in Salt Lake
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City assigned to oversee Mormon affairs in Mexico, "advised us to arm
ourselves and if it came to a case of shooting-to shoot first. My husband and I each slept with a gun under our pillow."54 While Ivins agreed
that assistance from church headquarters in Salt Lake City was necessary and that upgraded weapons should be purchased, he also wrote in
his journal in early April 1912that he feared the consequences if the
colonies received improved arms. 55 The equivocal, sometimes removed
nature of their stewardship led Junius Romney, resident leader of the
Mexico Mormons, to later complain that church authorities in Utah left
the colonists too much to themselves and failed to provide adequate
guidance. 56
Once the decision was made to upgrade their weaponry, however,
local leaders moved quickly to implement it. Orson Pratt Brown, a colonist residing in Sonora, was chosen to obtain high-grade Mauser rifles
from suppliers in the United States. Brown was the son of James Brown,
Jr., who with 3,000 Spanish doubloons, had purchased from Miles
Goodyear the site for the city of Odgen, Utah. 57 Given the name .of one
of Mormonism's greatest apologists, Orson was both a fierce defender
of the faith and a pioneer whose adventures carried him from Utah to
Arizona and in 1887 into Mexico. By the time of the Mexican Revolution, he had married four wives and fathered twenty-two children. 58 In
addition to filling important, leadership positions among the colonists,
and unlike the majority of his church brethren, Brown took a lively
interest in Mexican affairs. He named one son Porfirio Diaz and another Francisco Madero. 59 As the Revolution gained momentum, Brown
, sided with those seeking to overthrow the Diaz government, assisting
Maderistaforces as a scout and courier. Aligned with the revolutionaries, he became personally acquainted with Madero and Chihuahua's
Maderista governor, Gonzalez. After commencement of the Orozco revolt, Madero officials arranged with Brown to purchase guns, ammunition, and saddles in the United States for federal soldiers sent north to
counter rebel activities. 60 While some colonists resented Brown's involvement in Mexican revolutionary events, fearing it compromised
their image as neutrals, it was probably because of such experience that
he was chosen to purchase improved arms for the Mormons. 61
In early March 1912, under direction of church leaders, Brown asked
Reed Smoot, one of Utah's United States senators and an apostle of the
Mormon Church, to obtain official authorization for him to ship 250 new
rifles and 10,000 rounds of ammunition into Mexico for the colonists'
use. Due to the fear that rebels would seize such shipments, the necessary permits were not issued, and Brown was unable to complete the
assignment. 62 With funds provided by the church yet in hand it was
decided a month later that another attempt would be made to obtain
Mauser rifles-but this time by smuggling. 63 Inasmuch as President
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Taft's arms embargo had been put in place since Brown's earlier attempt, gun running was now both more difficult and more dangerous.
Nevertheless, Romney approved of taking the risk and authorized Brown
to select reliable assistants who could work with him in complete confidence. 64
After spending part of the money at his disposal on fifty guns and
ammunition in El Paso, Brown arranged to move everything across the
border on 2 April 1912. He sent the shipment by rail to Hermanas, a
small station west of Columbus, New Mexico, where a Mormon confederate, Ernest G. Taylor, was to receive them using the pseudonym
"T.G. Ernest." Numbers of Mexican and United States agents worked
in the area doing all they could to intercept arms on their way to
Orozquista rebels. Always alert to smuggling attempts, the agents
learned of the Brown shipment and took possession of it at Hermanas.
When Taylor saw that agents had discovered the shipment's contents,
he left the cased rifles and slipped away from the scene. Soldiers returned the shipment to El Paso, and Taylor hastened to warn Brown
that authorities were on his trail. Next morning, the El Paso Times published a front-page account of the seizure, speculating that the guns
were intended for the Mormon colonies in MexicoY As the individual
who signed for and sent the shipment, an indictment was quickly issued for Brown's arrest. 66
Brown, who stayed in a hotel room in EI Paso, immediately wired
Smoot in Washington, D.C. Smoot had been involved in refusing
Brown's earlier request for permission to ship weapons into Mexico.
On receiving Brown's telegram on 3 April 1912, the Senator returned
word that no such smuggling attempt should have been made without
the government's permission, and that there was little he could do to
keep Brown from being arrested and punished. 67 This rebuke notwithstanding, Smoot immediately went to the White House and spoke with
President Taft. After describing dangers facing the Mormon colonies,
Smoot persuaded Taft to make an exception to the arms embargo, ordering release of the guns in EI Paso and granting permission to ship
them across the international line. Smoot was told to see Secretary of
War Henry L. Stimson who would implement the President's decision. 68
Stimson and other military authorities feared that if the guns were
allowed to pass over the border, rebel soldiers would find a way to seize
them. 69 Stimson also told Smoot that arms trafficking required coordination with Mexican authorities, and that he therefore needed to work
with the Department of State. 70 Ordinarily Smoot would have looked
on this as an advantage inasmuch as the State Department's solicitor
was 1. Reuben Clark, a young Mormon lawyer from Utah. Clark, also
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hesitant, feared opposition to the idea from the Mexicans and complications of relations between the two governments. 71 Persuaded of the
problems, Smoot communicated his hesitancy in a telegram to Joseph
F. Smith, president of the Mormon Church. 72
Ten days later, however, the church president telegraphed Smoot
that the colonists were so threatened that something needed to be done. 73
Thereupon Smoot recommenced his efforts, making whirlwind visits to
the Departments of War, State, and Treasury. The next day, 15 April
1912, the senator recorded in his diary that the State Department undertook coordination of diplomatic permission and that word was sent to
Colonel Steever in EI Paso directing that the seized rifles be released.
Smoot telegraphed the news to both Mormon President Smith in Salt
Lake City and Brown in EI Paso. 74 These efforts constitute strong evidence that both the United States government and the Mormon hierarchy, whatever private misgivings existed, were willing to take formal
steps to arm church members in Mexico.
The War Department sent a permit to Brown authorizing release of
the guns and permission to move them across the border. With papers
in hand, a jubilant Brown had the indictment for his arrest quashed and
repossessed the impounded arms. His journal entries indicate that, free
of legal difficulties, he purchased additional rifles. The total number
purchased by Brown is uncertain but probably amounted to 250 new
Mausers.?5 Even though President Madero opposed such a plan because·
in many instances the rebels had secured the guns for themselves, American officials convinced Madero to let the shipment pass. 76
Official permission from Mexican officials notwithstanding, Brown
found it necessary to transport the firearms to the Chihuahua colonies
as inconspicuously as possible. With the help of discreet assistants
and traveling under cover of night, the guns were taken in false-bottomed wagons to the colonies of Dublan and Juarez. There they were
placed in the hands of Junius Romney who dispersed them to lesser
leaders with directions that trey were to be hidden. 77 Later in the summer, more rifles were smuggled by other colonists in wagons of hay
from Douglas, Arizona into the Mormon colony of Morelos in Sonora.
The daughter of one of those participating remembered that her father
had lied to Mexican border guards about his cargo, and that he and
other Mormons involved had acted as "contrabanderellos."78
Despite efforts at secrecy, word of the gun purchases found their
way into United States and Mexican newspapers. 79 Beyond this, in the
months following the April importation of their weapons, Mormon
spokesmen publicly used defiant language to describe the defensive
capacity of the colonists, referred to their determination to fight, and
explictly pointed to their ample supply of armaments. 80 It is not surprising, therefore, that Orozquistas responded as they did. Retreating

306

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

OCTOBER 1997

before advancing federal forces in early July, rebels under the command of Jose Ines Salazar settled in at Casas Grandes, near the Mormon colony of Dub Ian. Salazar immediately demanded that the Mormons
reveal to him all they possessed in the way of guns. When Mormon
leaders stalled, hoping federal forces would arrive and save them,
Salazar insisted the colonists surrender their firearms at once. 8l A large,
imposing man who had himself engaged in gun running along the border, Salazar knew the circumstances of the Mormons. 82 Failing to persuade him that they were poorly armed and needed their weapons for
self-protection, Junius Romney reported to church members on 25 July
that no choice was left, that they were surrounded by 2,000 Red Flaggers
with canon and "must either surrender their arms or ... fight."83
While still hoping for the arrival of federals or some other deliverance, Romney sent word to all the colonies to give their guns to the
Orozquistas. At the same time, he secretly communicated that the colonists' better weapons, including those recently smuggled from the United
States, were to be retained and kept hidden. 84 Still, with fewer guns
than before and their villages swarming with colorados, Romney decided that all women and children should be evacuated to the border
immediately, accompanied by enough men to assure their safety. This
decision, approved by Salazar, led to the first refugees arriving in border towns like EI Paso, Texas in late July and early August, 1912,85
Then, as Romney later recalled to an investigating committee of the
United States Congress, rebel soldiers further pressured the men remaining behind. 86 Salazar knew the Mormons were withholding newer,
high calibre rifles. United States Consul Thomas D. Edwards spoke directly to Salazar at this time, and Salazar claimed that he had no intention of either harming the Mormon colonists or provoking the United
States. Salazar stated he only wanted to provision his soldiers with badly
needed guns. 87
At this point, with women and children safely removed, Romney
was faced with either putting the new weapons to use or surrendering
them. For their part, Utah authorities seemed unable to advise him what
to do. Days before the colonists fled, Mormon president Smith in Salt
Lake City told Ivins, who was in EI Paso, and Romney, who was in the
colonies, simply to do as they felt best. Smith then left for a vacation in
Califorllia. 88 In his absence, the church's Council of Twelve Apostles
voted on 25 July to appropriate an additional $5,000 for the colonists'
defense. 89 Clearly, most church leaders in Utah remained committed to
an armed and forceful posture in the Mexican settlements.
Romney, however, decided that rather than risk lives by making a
fight of it, all male colonists should follow the women, evacuate their
villages, and escape to safety north of the border. 90 Reminiscent of the
hurried nature of their entry into Mexico a quarter-century earlier, the
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Mormon departure occurred so. quickly that most left with only the
clothes they wore and the high-powered rifles smuggled for their protection. Household goods and livestock were left behind. 91 While Romney gave instructions that men were to carry the new Mausers with them,
in one instance the departure was so sudden that some of the guns were
buried in a large bin of wheat. 92 Eventually, special expeditions of colonists retrieved all rifles left behind and, as property of the church, transported them to Salt Lake City. 93
With no one in the settlements, bandits ransacked them at will.
Crowded into tents and shacks on the north side of the Texas-New
Mexico border, Mormon refugees became discouraged as word of destruction in the colonies reached them. A meeting in El Paso, called to
assess the situation, led to outbursts of anger. The colonists criticized
those decisions that authorized the smuggling of firearms and precipitated abandonment of their homes. 94 Ivins asked Romney why he considered the colonists to have been defenseless when they arrived at the
boundary bearing "hundreds of guns and thousands of cartridges."95 The
question seemed to intimate that the colonists should have stayed and
fought. Yet, shortly after making this remark, Ivins wrote the president
of the church that it would have cost thousands of lives·to have resisted, and that departure of the colonists had been the only "proper
course to pursue."96
Brown, an active participant in the El Paso discussions, not only
approved of the colonists' leaving but wrote to the El Paso Times that
retribution was in order. His long-time attachment to Mexican society
now gave way to other feelings. The colonists' misfortunes, he said,
were owing to the "savagery and brutal indecency" of their "cursed,
inbred [Mexican] neighbors."97 Brown urged that, while it was yet unsafe for families, a body of men should be gathered to recross the border and take back their farms from "those black devils who had driven
us from our homes. "98 Mormon leaders in Utah expressed no opinion in
the matter, telling colonists they could return to Mexico, remain where
they were, or settle elsewhere. Federal authorities in the United States
concurred, but warned that anyone who recrossed the boundary must
take care with regard to guns, especially avoiding the company of those
who were no more than filibusterers. 99 Aided by an appropriation of
$100,000 from the United States government, most colonists, uncertain
of what awaited them in Mexico, dispersed to new locations in the western United States~ 100
Resettled colonists soon discovered, however, that fellow church
members north of the border were not as welcoming as anticipated. This
arose from the fact that the Mexican Mormons were rejoining a religious denomination that no longer approved the practice of plural marriage. When in Mexico, the colonists considered themselves a stalwart,
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Mormon elite. Now, returned to the body of the church, they were an
embarrassing, polygamous minority from an earlier period of Mormon
life. Church leaders relegated hundreds to an inferior status within their
new congregations. lol In this sense, the refugees were twice dispossessed.
If Mormon attempts to remain neutral-feigning pacifism while preparing to fight, surrendering guns while smuggling, and holding others
in reserve-failed to secure their homes in Mexico, they were no less
compromised by the official policies of the United States. The capricious enforcement of neutrality laws in the period preceding the Mormon departure continued after it. Favoring first one than another faction
in Mexico, pretending neutrality, federal officials in Washington followed an uneven course. Writing to Ivins late in 1912, Smoot said he
favored a complete and free flow of arms into Mexico so revolutionary
regimes like that of Madero could more easily be overthrown. 102 While
Smoot's suggestions were never implemented, armaments continued to
move across the border. By 1919, it was alleged that $20,000,000 of
guns and ammunition were smuggled into Mexico yearly. Every ruse
conceivable, from legal loopholes to hiding ammunition in watermelons, was exploited to supply warring parties. ,03 While it has been argued that only by alternately tightening and relaxing control over the
arms traffic could the United States influence events in Mexico, there
is no doubt that American munitions fueled violence in that country for
years to come. 104
The few Mormons who returned to Mexico found most of the colonies had been pillaged. By abandoning their communities, soldiers and
local inhabitants straggled through, doing as they pleased: destroying
structures; smashing sewing machines and musical instruments; shooting domestic animals, and indiscriminately burning crops. lOS In September 1912, when a few men crossed the border to survey the situation
in Colonia Morelos, they found that rebel soldiers had either looted 'or
destroyed every home in the town. 106 Even after decades of waiting for
the Special Mexican Claims Commission to act, few received compensation for their losses.l0 7 Only two Mormon colonies survive today:
Colonias Juarez and Dublan. Abandoned, overrun by weeds and sand,
the rest became, in the words of one former occupant, "never to be
inhabited save by an occasional ranchero or some wandering nomad. "108
What led to the Mormon exodus was less Mexican yanquiphobia,
less revolutionary assaults on their properties and persons, than policies of their own making. The losses they sustained occurred overwhelmingly after, rather than before, their departure. The decision to smuggle
guns into their colonies, not the generalized terrors of revolution, was
what precipitated their "exodus."109 This conforms to a growing sense
by historians that hostility toward and suffered by North Americans
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during the early years of the Revolution has been overstated. llo Evidence supports the case for a moderated view of Mexican behavior for
it was Mormons who smuggled weapons into Mexico, withheld arms,
and ultimately abandoned their communities.
Wavering between dependence on providence and measures of self
defense, the importation of improved firearms only inflamed the
Orozq~ista soldiers. Attempts by Senator Reed Smoot and President
William Taft to clear the way for the trans-border shipment of such
weapons invited, as others warned it would, the rapacity of Jose Ines
Salazar and his men. Caught between contending armies, Mormon leaders made decisions that invited commanders to take advantage of military assets possessed by the settlers. The consequence, as one former
colonist put it, was that, having gone to Mexico "as refugees," they
"came back as refugees" again. 111 Possessing little more than the guns
they smuggled, displaying the same bereft, driven appearance of their
crossing into Mexico in the 1880s, thousands of Mormons returned to
the nation they had fled a generation before.
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